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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION-
SEPARATION OF POWERS-THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF WOMEN
FROM THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Rostker v. Goldberg (U.S. 1981)
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter,
in early 1980, pursuant to his authority under the Military Selective
Service Act (MSSA) 1 to require the registration of "every male citizen," 2
ordered that the induction registration process be reactivated.3 The
President further recommended that Congress amend the MSSA to call
for the registration of females as well as males.4 In response, Congress
allocated the funds to reactivate the registration process for males, but
declined to amend the MSSA to pernit the registration of females. 5
Consequently, President Carter issued a proclamation 6 ordering the
registration of specific groups of young men. 7
1. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-462 (1981).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1981). The purpose of a registration is to facili-
tate any eventual conscription that may take place. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
3. 101 S. Ct. at 2649. The President did not seek conscription. Id.
at n.l. Registration was seen, however, as a "necessary step to preserving or
enhancing our national security interests." Department of Defense Authoriza-
tlion for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1805 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Hearings on S. 2294].
4. 101 S. Ct. at 2649.
5. Id. See S. REP. No. 789, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 at n.1, 2 (1980), 126
CONG. REC. S6546 (June 10, 1980) (remarks of Senator Nunn). Congress con-
sidered and rejected a proposal to provide for the registration of women as
well as men under the MSSA in S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The report was prepared by the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Authorization Bill. Id. at 160-61. The findings
were subsequently endorsed by the House and Senate conferees on the Bill.
S. CONF. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980). Both the Senate and
the House adopted the Report's findings by passing the Conference Report.
126 CONG. REc. H7800, S11646 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1980).
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2649. A proclamation is a formal declaration causing
some governmental matters to be published, that is issued by the proper au-
thority, usually a high government executive. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1086
(5th ed. 1979).
7. 101 S. Ct. at 2649. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1981) provides for the regis-
tration of "every male citizen ... and every other male person residing in the
United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent
registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six." Id.
(182)
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A class action s suit was reactivated 9 before a three-judge panel 0
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, allegi ng that the MSSA im-
permissibly discriminated between males and females." The district
court held that the MSSA was unconstitutional, 12 finding that it violated
the due process clause of the fifth amendment,' 3 and enjoined the
enforcement of registration under the MSSA.' 4
8. 101 S. Ct. at 2650. The class cventually consisted of "all male persons
who are registered under 50 U.S.C. app. §453 or are liable for training
and service in the armed forces of the United States under 50 U.SC. app.
§§454, 456(h), and 467(c); and who are also either subject to registration
under Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently
registered with the Selective Service System." Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F.
Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
9. 101 S. Ct. at 2650. The suit was originally instituted in 1971 when
several men subject to registration under the MSSA filed suit in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania seeking the empaneling of a three-judge district
court to challenge the constitutionality of the MSSA. The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality, and injunctive relief against en-
forcement of the MSSA. Id. Relief was denied and all of these claims were
dismissed. Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except
the one claiming gender discrimination. 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973). On
remand, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert the
claim, and that the claim was substantial enough to convene a three-judge
panel. 101 S. Ct. at 2650, n.2. In July, 1974, the panel refused to dismiss
the case as moot. 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The case then lay
dormant for five years until the present class was certified.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 2650. The panel was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2282 (1970), which was subsequently repealed. Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-2.
90 Stat. 1119 (1976). However, the statute remained applicable to suits filed
before it was repealed. Id. § 7, 90 Stat. 1120 (1976).
11. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
12. Id. at 605. The district court additionally found that the plaintiffs
had standing and that the case was ripe for adjudication. Id. at 591, 592.
These issues were not contested on appeal. The Court emphasized that it
only decided the constitutionality of the registration, not of a subsequent con-
scription. Id.
13. Id. Although the fifth amendment does not contain an express guaran-
tee of equal protection, it has been held that "the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in discrimina-
tion that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 11.3 (1975), quoting Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954).
14. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
court applied the "important government interest test" articulated in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and determined that the legislative objectives
were insufficient to justify the total exclusion of women from the registration
process. Id. at 597. For a discussion of Craig v. Boren, see notes 36-43 and
accompanying text injra. The legislative objectives, as set forth by the dis-
trict court rested upon the fact that women are excluded from combat posi-
tions. The court stated:
[i]n a time of mobilization the primary need of the military services
will be in combat related positions and in support position personnel
who can readily be deployed into combat; therefore, in order to maxi-
mize the flexibility of personnel management, women should be ex-
cluded from the (MSSA).
509 F. Supp. at 600 (footnote omitted).
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Justice Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit,
stayed the lower court's order enjoining registration.1 5 On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court, holding that
Congress had acted within the scope of its constitutional authority to
raise and regulate the military, and that the MSSA did not violate the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101
S.. Ct. 2646 (1981).
Both the fourteenth and fifth amendments 16 to the Constitution
guarantee the equal protection of the laws. The former expressly pro-
vides that "[n]o State . . . shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 17 The latter, while not
expressly mentioning equal protection, 8 has been held to provide this
right.' 9
Alleged violations of equal protection have generally been examined
by the courts under either a "rational relationship" or "strict scrutiny"
standard. 20 Under the rational relationship standard, the statute in
question is presumed constitutional, and need only be reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate legislative purpose.2 1  Under strict scrutiny, the
statute will be upheld if it is necessary to further a compelling govern-
mental interest.2 2 Strict scrutiny is applied only when a statute contains
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2651. Registration was commenced two days later.
16. For the text of the fourteenth and fifth amendments, see text ac-
companying note 17, and note 18 infra.
17. U.S. CoNrs., amend. XIV.
18. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
• .. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST., amend. V.
19. See note 13 supra.
20. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), where the Court
held:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of dis-
cretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differ-
ently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the State's objective .... A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it.
Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted). See also McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949). See generally Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 698-702 (1977);
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1975).
Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of
Kahn v. Shevin 'and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 639, 644-45 (1979). •
22. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (racial classifica-
tions constitutionally suspect); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (racial classifications subject to most rigid scrutiny).
[Vol. 27: p. 182Z
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a classification based upon a "suspect criterion," 23 or when it implicates
a fundamental right.
2 4
Statutes involving gender discrimination were traditionally evaluated
under the rational relationship standard,2 5 and courts generally accepted
the legislative classifications.2 6 It was not until Reed v. Reed in 1971
that gender-based classifications were subjected to heightened scrutiny. 27
In striking down a state statute which preferred males over equally
qualified females for the administration of decedent's estates, the Reed
Court ruled that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either
sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 28
The highest degree of scrutiny in gender-based discrimination cases
was applied by a Supreme Court plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson.
2 9
In Frontiero, the Court invalidated a statute which defined spouses of
male members of the Air Force as dependents for purposes of increased
quarters allowances and other benefits.30 However, spouses of female
23. The following cases have held various classifications to be suspect:
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org'n
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (illegitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (national origin); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
See also Bice, supra note 21, at 693-95.
24. The following cases have held various rights to be fundamental:
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate); Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (right to the free exercise of religion); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (right of association); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a criminal appeal). See also Bice, supra note 21,
at 695-98.
25. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
26. Id. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Goesaert was typical
of the traditional deference. The Goesaert Court upheld a statute prohibiting
women from being bartenders unless they were the wife or daughter of the
owner, reasoning that if the state legislature had any justification in mind
when enacting the statute the gender classification should be upheld. Id. at
466. The Court stated:
The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men
have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from draw-
ing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the
regulation of the liquor traffic.
Id.
27. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
28. Id. at 76. The standard of review was not as deferential toward
legislative judgments, in that the Court required that a classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id., quoting Royster
GuanoCo. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
29. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
30. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1968).
1981-82]
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members of the Air Force were not defined as dependents unless they
were in fact dependent for over one half of their support.3 l The
plurality in Frontiero 32 found gender to be a suspect classification,
3:
and therefore applied the strict scrutiny standard.
3 4
In later cases the Court retreated from such a strict level of scrutiny
in gender discrimination suits.35 In Craig v. Boren,36 a mid-tier level
of scrutiny was articulated by the Court which required that "classi-
fications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." a7
Craig held that a statute which allowed females between the ages
of eighteen and twenty to consume 3.2% beer invidiously dis-
criminated against males of the same age group who were prohibited
from drinking 3.2% beer.38 Subsequent cases have generally applied
the Craig standard of review in gender classification cases.a9
31. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1975).
32. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan, and was
joined by Justices Marshall, Douglas, and White. Justice Stewart concurred
separately. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
33. 411 U.S. at 688. Justice Brennan concluded that sex was "suspect"
because "sex . . . is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth. . . . [T]he sex characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society." Id. at 686.
34.. Id. at 688. "[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications based
upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id.
Strict judicial scrutiny in gender-based discrimination cases could once
again become applicable if the proposed Equal Rights Amendment is passed.
The proposed amendment reads as follows: "Equality of rights under law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex." Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, S.J. REs.
8, 9; H.R.J. REs. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The proposed amendment has been passed by both Houses of Congress.
See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). At present, the proposed amendment must be ratified
by three more states before June 30, 1982, to become part of the United States
Constitution. See The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 30, 1981, at 27-A, col. 6.
35. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text infra.
36. 420 U.S. 190 (1976).
37. Id. at 197. Justice Brennan, who advocated the application of strict
scrutiny in Frontiero, wrote the majority opinion in Craig. Because the
Court saw Reed as controlling, it adopted a less stringent level of review.
Id. at 199.
38. Id. at 204.
39. At present, the Craig standard is the one commonly applied in gender-
based discrimination suits.
In several post Craig cases where the mid-tier level of review was used,
the legislative classifications have been upheld. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347 (1979) (prohibition against institution of wrongful death actions
by fathers but not mothers of illegitimate children upheld); Personnel Ad-
[Vol. 27: p. 182
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Under the application of the mid-tier level of scrutiny, it has been
held that "administrative convenience" 40 is no justification for a
gender-based classification, and is not a "mere shibboleth, the mere
recitation of which dictates constitutionality." 41 The rationale for this
rejection is that such a classification of necessity constitutes "dissimilar
treatment for men and women who are ... similarly situated," 42 and
thus is the sort of arbitrary legislative classification forbidden by the
Constitution.43
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (lifetime preference
for veterans as opposed to non-veterans upheld because gender-neutral).
In other cases, however, the Court has struck down several legislative
classifications as violative of the Craig standard. See, e.g., Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (classification requiring
widowers but not widows to prove dependency in order to collect workmen's
compensation death benefits not sufficiently related to state interest); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (statute allowing mother, but not father,
of illegitimate child to block adoption by withholding consent struck down);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statute requiring husband only to pay alimony
not substantially related to state purpose).
The rational relationship test has been applied in recent gender classifica-
tion cases only where the Court recognized the classification as necessary to
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975) (rational basis test used to uphold differing tenure require-
ments for male and female officers); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (ra-
tional basis test used to uphold property tax exemption favorable to widows,
but not widowers). See also Hull, supra note 21, at 657-63; Bice, supra note
21, at 702-07.
40. For an example of an administrative convenience rationale, see Weng-
ler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). In Wengler, a workmen's
compensation dependency statute requiring widowers, but not widows, to prove
dependency was struck down as an arbitrary classification based merely on
gender, and not sufficiently related to the government's purpose of providing
for needy spouses. Id. at 152. The justification for the distinction between
widows and widowers was that individual inquiries as to dependency would
be "prohibitively costly." Id. The Court reasoned that "the bare assertion
of this argument falls far short of justifying gender-based discrimination on
the grounds of administrative convenience." Id.
41. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690. Although Frontiero ap-
plied strict scrutiny, a similar rejection of administrative convenience has oc-
curred under the mid-tier and rationality levels of scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198.
42. 411 U.S. at 690, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
43. 411 U.S. at 690. Similarly, courts will reject, as justification for a
gender-based classification, "archaic and overbroad generalizations relating to
the differences in behavior and capabilities between the sexes." Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508. If the differences in treatment stem from notions
of the roles played by men and women, they represent "outmoded way(s) of
thinking about members of the opposite sex." Owens v. Brown; 455 F. Supp.
291, 303 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (statute
based on notion that females are emancipated earlier than males unconstitu-
tional); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (presumption that work-
ing women dependent on their spouses for support struck down as improper
generalization).
6
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When the "substantial relationship standard" is applied in the
military context, 44 an additional consideration arises concerning the
deference that is owed by the courts to the political branches in the
exercise of their constitutional authority over the military.45  Such
deference is a function of the doctrine of separation of powers,46 or of
"the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government." 47
The area of military affairs, in particular, is largely unfamiliar to
the courts, and consequently, courts grant to congressional judgments
in this area an "especially high degree of respect." 48 This is due in
part to the express constitutional commitment of military affairs to the
political branches, 49 and in part because of the "essential differences
between the military and civilian communities that counsel strongly in
favor of executive autonomy in military matters, subject to legislative
guidance." 5o Courts often are compelled to abstain due to a lack
of competence where review would entail "complex, subtle and profes-
sional decisions [which are] subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches." 51
44. See notes 45-65 and accompanying text infra.
45. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16. The Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to "raise and support Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy,"
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
"provide for calling forth the Militia," "provide for organizing, arming and
disciplining the Militia ...... Id., cls. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Clause 18 of article
I provides Congress with the authority "to make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." Id., cl. 18.
46. See Johnson, The Role of the Judiciary With Respect to the Other
Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455 (1977). "[Tlhe doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, reflects the deeply held belief of our founding fathers that
the powers of government should be separate and distinct, with the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial departments being independent and coordinate
branches of government." Id. at 463. See also Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Johnson &- McAfee, A Dialogue
on the Political Question Doctrzne, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 523 (1978); Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517 (1966).
47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1961).
48. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978). Courts likewise
refrain from examining legislative motive. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931).
49. See note 45 supra. "The constitutional power of Congress to raise
and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is
broad and sweeping." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. See also
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
50. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978).
51. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (emphasis supplied by the
Court). The petitioner in Gilligan sought "continuing surveillance by a federal
court over the training, weaponry and orders of the [National] Guard," a func-
tion which does not come under the aegis of judicial authority. Id. at 6. See
also Scharpf, supra note 46, at 560: "[T]he Court does not hold that legal rules
do not apply; it holds that competence to apply them should rest with the
political departments." Id.
[Vol. 27: p. 182
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Balanced against this traditional deference to the executive and the
legislature is the principle that it is the "province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 52 While courts respect the
judgments of the coordinate branches, they do not abdicate their con-
stitutional responsibility to decide cases and controversies."5 Rather, the
function of the court in such situations is to ensure that the challenged
congressional action "conformed to the constitutional limitations under
which Congress was permitted to exercise its basic powers." 54 Even in
the military context, Congress and the armed forces are still subject to
the Bill of Rights and its constitutional ramifications.r5 An example of
the exercise of this power of review by a court is Owens v. Brown. 6
The Owens Court struck down a portion of a statute which pro-
hibited women from sea duty except on certain ships.57 Although em-
phasizing the high degree of deference owed to the political branches in
a military context,58 the Court did not decline to review the case because
the constitutional right of equal protection was implicated.59 The Court
applied the Craig mid-tier level of scrutiny, 60 on the ground that the
statute "allow[ed] of but one distinction, that of male and female." 61
52. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
53. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
54. Licliter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 765 (1948). Lichter involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act, which authorized re-
covery of excess profits made during World War II. Id. at 746. The Court
noted that the congressional power to pass the Act was "inescapably express, not
merely implied." Id. at 756. However, the Supreme Court did not abstain
from reviewing the case, because it was not reviewing the power of the govern-
ment to so legislate. Id. at 765. Rather, it was fulfilling its role as the "ulti-
mate arbiter of the Constitution." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1967).
55. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
57. Id. See 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1959). Section 6015 provides in pertinent
part, that females are prohibited from being "assigned to duty on vessels or in
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions ... (or) assigned to duty on vessels
of the Navy other than hospital ships (or) transports." Id.
58. 455 F. Supp. at 299-300.
59. Id. at 302. The Court recognized that "while the obvious differences
between the military and civilian communities provide the backdrop against
which to test the lawfulness of military decisions, they do not of necessity
furnish a basis for foregoing review." Id. at 301.
The Court struck down the nondiscretionary provisions of the statute
because the absolute prohibition of women on sea vessels was not substantially
related to the government's purpose of increasing the combat effectiveness of
Navy ships. Id. at 305.
60. 429 U.S. at 190. For a discussion of the mid-tier level of review in
equal protection cases, see notes 36-43 and accompanying text supra.
61. 455 F. Supp. at 294.
1981-82]
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In Schlesinger v. Ballard r- the Court faced the issue of whether
differing terms of tenure for male and female naval officers constituted
an unconstitutional gender-based classification in violation of the due
process clause.63 The Court accepted the legislative classification, not
because such a decision was beyond the scope of judicial authority, but
because no due process violation had occurred.6 4
Thus, while deference to political military judgments is a factor
to be weighed in a gender-based discrimination claim, the court is not
precluded from determining whether the powers of the political branches
"have been exercised in conformity to the Constitution, and if they have
not, to treat their acts as null and void." 10
Against this background, the Goldberg Court commenced its
analysis by emphasizing the deference to be accorded by courts to con-
gressional actions because "Congress is a coequal branch of government
whose members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution
of the United States." 67 The Court noted that such deference was
appropriate in this instance where Congress specifically considered the
constitutionality of exempting women from registration, and particularly
where the issue involved congressional authority over military matters. 6s
The Court also noted that, in the area of military affairs, courts are
62. 419 U.S. at 498.
63. Id. Petitioner, a male naval officer, had failed on two occasions to
be promoted during his nine years of active service, and thus was subject to
mandatory discharge. Id. See 10 U.S.C. §6382(a) (1956). However, his
female counterparts were afforded thirteen years of active service before being
subject to a mandatory discharge for not receiving a promotion. 419 U.S. at
498. See 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1959).
64. 419 U.S. at 509. The Court recognized the authority of Congress
over the military pursuant to Article I, § 8, cls. 12-14 of the Constitution. 419
U.S. at 510. However, tile majority additionally stressed that, to the extent
that women are prohibited from serving in combat, males and females are not,
similarly situated for purposes of the challenged statutes. Id. at 508. Con-
sequently, the gender-based classification was not unconstitutional. Id. at 510.
65. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506 (1967), quoting Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1881).
66. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined.
justices White and Marshall each filed dissenting opinions, which werejoined by Justice Brennan.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2651.
68. Id. In its report on the issue of registering women, Congress also
emphasized the deference owing to the judgments of Congressional and mili-
tary leaders in dealing with military affairs. See S. REP. No. 826, supra note
5, at 160.
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incompetent to make substantive adjudications, 9 and consequently, a
deferential stance -is essential to an adequate adjudication.70
The majority cautioned, however, that despite such broad authority,
Congress' activities must nonetheless conform to the mandates of the
Constitution, and specifically, the limitations of the due process clause.7 '
The Court emphasized that, while "not abdicat[ing] . . . ultimate re-
sponsibility to decide the constitutional question," it would refrain from
substituting its judgment for that of Congress. 72
The majority disagreed with the district court's determination that
the issue in Goldberg did not involve military affairs and that a
deferential stance need not, therefore, be taken. 73 The Court asserted
instead that "[r]egistration is not an end in itself in the civilian world
but rather the first step in the induction process into the military
one." 74
Even though a certain degree of deference was recognized, the Court
also referred to the gender-based "heightened scrutiny" test of Craig v.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2652. The Goldberg Court quoted its prior opinion
in Gilligan, stating:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and profes-
sional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and con-
trol of a military force are essentially professional military judgments,
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
branches.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. at 10 (emphasis in original). The Court relied
upon additional authority in support of the same principle. 101 S. Ct. at
2652, citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953); Simmons v. United
States, 406 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969).
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2652. The majority relied upon several other cases in
support of its deferential attitude. Id., citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980) (prior restraint on right to petition military personnel upheld); Midden-
dorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (deference given to Congress in not providing
right to counsel in summary court martial proceeding); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 28 (1976) (first amendment restrictions on military base upheld); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (Congress allowed more freedom in making legislation
when it relates to military society); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605
(1931) (congressional withholding of citizenship upheld).
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
72. Id. In admitting that traditional due process limitations may be
somewhat more relaxed in a military context, the majority balanced its role
as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution against the necessity of deferring to
the political branches in military matters: "simply labeling the legislative
decision 'military' on the one hand or 'gender-based' on the other does not
automatically guide a court to the correct constitutional result." Id. at 2654.
73. Id. at 2653. For a discussion of the district court's rationale, see notes
12-14 and accompanying text supra. The majority also rejected the argument of
respondent that the issue of registration only indirectly affected the national
defense and involved civilian, not military, affairs. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
74. Id. The court relied upon S. REP. No. 826 for its determination that
Congress specifically linked its discussion of registration to the induction
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Boren.75 The Court added, however, that too great a reliance on degrees
of deference or levels of scrutiny could lead to "facile abstractions used
to justify a result." 76 Instead, the Court noted that when Congress is
laced with a choice between two alternatives, and its choice is being
challenged on equal protection grounds, "the question a court must
decide is not which alternative it would have chosen, had it been the
primary decisionmaker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies
equal protection of the laws." 77
The majority affirmed the congressional decision-making process in
this case by undertaking an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history
involved.78 The Court asserted that "the decision to exempt women
from registration was not the 'accidental byproduct of a traditional way
of thinking about women.' 79
The majority emphasized that registration is but the first step in
the continuous process of induction s 0 and added that its purpose "was
to prepare for a draft of combat troops." 81 In light of this purpose it
would be inappropriate for women to be registered, because, as the
majority noted, women have consistently been restricted from combat
eligibility.s 2 The Court thus reasoned that men and women were not
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2654, citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 190. For a
discussion of the Craig mid-tier level of scrutiny, see notes 36-43 and ac-
companying text supra.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2654. The majority steered a middle ground between
"[s]imply labelling the legislative decision 'military' on the one hand or
'gender-based' on the other," and acknowledged that the government's purpose
in raising and supporting armies was an important enough interest to fulfill
the first requirement of the two pronged mid-tier test. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2655-60. The Court noted that the 1980 legislative history, as
opposed to the legislative history at the time of the enactment of the MSSA
in 1948 was the most relevant. Id. at 4803. "Congress did not change the
MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly reconsider the question of exempting
women from its provisions, and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative
history is, therefore, highly relevant in assessing the constitutional validity of
the exemption." Id.
79. Id., quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2656, citing Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553(1944); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 9 (1953).
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2657 (emphasis supplied by the Court). The Court noted
that this ruling was supported by the legislative history in S. REP. No. 826,
supra note 5, at 160 ("if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario,
the primary manpower need would be for combat replacements"); and in
Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 3, at 1688 (Senator Jepson) ("The shortage
would be in the combat arms. That is why you have drafts"). 101 S. Ct.
at 2657.
The Court further attributed Congress with explaining that the registra-
tion procedure would ensure an early delivery of inductees in the event of a
national emergency. Id., citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5, at 154-55.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 2657-58. The majority noted that the use of women in
combat positions in the Navy and Air Force is restricted by virtue of 10 U.S.C.§§6015 and 8549 (1959). 101 S. Ct. at 2657. For the pertinent provisions
of § 6015, see note 57 supra.
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similarly situated, and to exempt women from registration is not viola-
tive of the due process clause.8 3
The majority considered the argument that a small number of
women could be drafted,8 4 but concluded that the time and expense
entailed would outweigh the benefits.85  Also, the Court found that
any need for women in noncombat positions could be adequately served
by volunteers.8 6 The Court accepted Congress' determination that the
presence of women in noncombat positions would severely impede
military flexibility because rotation between combat and noncombat
positions would be limited, thus restricting the available manpower.8 7
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion,88 disagreed with the inter-
pretation of the record by the majority, and would have been satisfied
in vacating the lower court judgment and remanding for further hear-
ings on the issue of the feasibility of including women within the scope
of registration8s He disagreed with the majority's position that the
volunteer force alone would be sufficient to fill the noncombat positions
in the event of mobilization, and asserted that the record supported a
contrary finding.9 0
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2658. The Court concluded that such an exemption
is "not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing
registration." Id.
The Court addressed the issue of equality between the sexes, and, while
recognizing that it is a legitimate viewpoint, found that the military necessity
of instituting a pool of strong combat troops predominated. Id. at 2659.
84. Id. The Court noted the testimony of military experts that if a draft
arose, of a possible 650,000 registrants, the military could absorb up to 80,000
women inductees. Id. at 4804-05, citing Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 3, at
1161, 1828. These 80,000 women would be placed in noncombat positions.
101 S. Ct. at 2659.
85. Id. at 2660. The Court relied upon S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5,
at 159 (administrative problems to be dealt with). 101 S. Ct. at 2660. The
Report also referred to the widespread societal impact that would result, with
sweeping implications that are "unwise and unacceptable to a large majority
of our people." Id.
86. Id. The Court adopted the Senate Committee findings that, because
of the combat restrictions on women, the need for men would predominate,
and volunteers would fill whatever positions were available to women. Id.,
citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5, at 160.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. "In peace and war, significant rotation of per-
sonnel is necessary. . . . Large numbers of combat positions must be available
to which combat troops can return for duty before being redeployed." Id.
citing S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5, at 158.
88. 101 S. Ct. at 2661 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissenting
opinion was joined in by Justice Brennan.
89. Id.
90. Id. Justice White also rejected the administrative convenience rationale
adopted by the majority, in that it was an insufficient justification for gender-
based discrimination. Id. at 2662 (White, J., dissenting).
12
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion relied upon the record in
asserting that the majority's reasoning was flawed in several respects.91
First, Justice Marshall saw the majority as assuming the existence of a
draft wherein every position had to be filled with combat personnel,
when, in reality, "no such guarantee is possible." 02 Secondly, Justice
Marshall contends that there was no evidence in the record to support
the majority's contention that every draftee must be combat trained.93
Finally, Justice Marshall asserted that, since certain positions could
be filled by either men or women, they are thus similarly situated to
that extent.w Neither the interest of the government in raising and
supporting armies, nor the absence of a "military need" to draft women
"provide[s] the constitutionally required justification for the total ex-
clusion of women from registration and draft plans." 95
In reviewing the Goldberg decision, it is submitted that the Court
was correct in recognizing that the Constitution mandates a degree of
deference to the legislative branch in military matters. 96 Although the
Court is the "ultimate arbiter of the Constitution," 97 this power must
be tempered by the respect and deference due the Congress in the proper
exercise of its constitutionally delegated functions.98
However, a deferential attitude toward the Congress in military
decisions should not necessitate an alteration of existing equal pro-
tection standards.m It is possible to apply a strict or mid-tier equal
91. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
was joined in by Justice Brennan.
'Justice Marshall initially disagreed with the majority's formulation of the
standard to apply in a gender-based discrimination case: "The relevant inquiry
under the Craig v. Boren test is not whether a gender-neutral classification
would substantially advance important governmental interests. Rather, the
question is whether the gender-based classification is itself substantially related
to the achievement of the asserted governmental interest." Id. at 2666 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by Justice Marshall).
92. Id. at 2667 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2668 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall relied on the
record to support his theory that not every draftee needs to be combat-trained.
Id., citing S. REP. No. 826, at 160 (primary manpower needed for combat).
See note 5 and accompanying text supra for a discussion and the text of S.
REP. No. 826.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2670 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that
the absence of a military need to draft women is irrelevant to a resolution of
the equal protection issue at stake. Id. at 2671 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55. For a discussion of the requirement of
deference to political decisions, see notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra.
97. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1967).
98. For a discussion of this deference, see generally Johnson, supra note
46; Henkin, supra note 46.
99. The majority avoided a commitment to any particular standard of
review, and defined its task as deciding "whether Congress, acting under an
explicit constitutional grant of authority, has by that action transgressed an
[Vol. 27: p. 182
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protection test while simultaneously proceeding with a measure of
respect due to a legislative judgment, in the analysis under that test.
For example, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,00 the Court applied traditional
equal protection principles to a gender-based discrimination claim, while
concurrently announcing a degree of deference to the legislative de-
cision.101 It is submitted that a more definitive stance by the Goldberg
majority as to the precise standard of review applied would have helped
to clarify prior uneven interpretations in gender discrimination cases
while leaving Congress latitude in its decisions regarding the military.
10 2
It is also submitted that the Court need not have deferred to the
legislative judgment as absolutely as it did, but rather could have
modified the district court order 103 to conform to the legislative history
as a whole, as well as to the current status of women in the military.104
explicit guarantee of individual rights which limits the authority so conferred."
101 S. Ct. at 2654. It is suggested that in not applying any established
standard, the Court may have ignored clearly defined tests.
The Court did acknowledge that the government's interest in raising
and supporting armies met the second prong of the Craig v. Boren standard,
namely, an important governmental interest. Id. However, it never applied
the remainder of the test, i.e., whether the classification is "substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
For a discussion of the equal protection standards of review, see notes 20-43
and accompanying text supra.
100. 419 U.S. at 498.
101. Id. at 510. The majority relied upon Schlesinger several times to
support a theory of deference to legislative judgments in military matters.
101 S. Ct. at 2651, 2654, 2655. However, the rationale of the two opinions
varies. The Schlesinger Court upheld the congressional decision because no
due process violation had been established. 419 U.S. at 410. Similarly, the
present majority noted that the total exclusion of women from registration
did not violate the due process clause. 101 S. Ct. at 2658. However, a
stronger emphasis was placed upon the deference owed the legislature in
Rostker because of the military context in which it arose: "[W]e cannot
ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the Constitution to raise and
support armies when we are urged to declare unconstitutional its studied
choice of one alternative in preference to another for furthering that goal."
Id. at 2655. For a discussion of Schlessinger, see notes 62-64 and accompanying
text supra.
102. For a discussion of the uneven results of the application of the mid-
tier level of review, see note 39 supra. See also Hull, supra note 21, at 671.
"Whether or not a given classification furthers an 'important governmental
interest,' or is substantially related to this interest, are subjective determina-
tions, and a conservative majority is as likely to conclude one way as a liberal
majority is to conclude the other." Id.
103. See Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. at 605. For a discussion of the
district court's rationale, see notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
104. The Court reasoned that "the primary manpower need would be for
combat replacements." 101 S. Ct. at 2657. Because women are prohibited
from serving in combat by virtue of 10 U.S.C. § 6015, the Court concluded
that women were not needed for induction, and therefore should not be
required to register. 101 S. Ct. at 2658. The record establishes, however,
that women in the military perform vital functions in highly technical areas
that are not combat-related, and thus need not be rotated into combat deploy-
1981-82]
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This could have been done without overturning the long-standing pro-
hibition of women serving in combat, 10 5 while holding the MSSA un-
constitutional insofar as it conflicted with the evidence in the record
regarding the extensive use of women in the military. 106 It is further
suggested that the majority relied upon certain assumptions tending to
justify its conclusions, that are not supported in the legislative history. 0
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Court erred in using the
"administrative convenience" los rationale as a justification for uphold-
ing the gender-based classification; regardless of the standard of review
applied, such a rationalization has been held to be nothing more than
"a mere shibboleth" to disguise an invidious discriminatory purpose.'x°
The Court reinforced its position with supporting documentation from
the record." 0 However, in such an instance, it is suggested that the
proper role of the Court would have been to reverse the legislature on
that issue, because administrative convenience is an unacceptable justi-
fication for a gender-based classification."'
ment. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5, at 157, wherein the Senate
found that "[w]omen now volunteer for military service and are assigned to
most military specialties. These volunteers now make an important contribu-
tion to our Armed Forces." Id. See also Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 3,
at 171, 182.
105 10 U.S.C. §6015 (1959). For the pertinent provisions of § 6015, see
note 57 supra.
106. For a discussion of the importance of women in the military, see
note 104 supra.
107. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2656-57, wherein the Court assumed that
registration would of necessity lead to immediate induction. Congress, how-
ever, has stated that registration is to prepare for full manpower mobilization
in the event that a national emergency arises. See S. REP. No. 826, supra note
5, at 154-55. The current status of the law is limited to registration only. Id.
Furthermore, induction itself was not challenged by respondents. 101 S. Ct.
at 2650, n.2. Nor did the President in his recommendation seek conscription.
Id. at 2649, n.l. Additionally, it was noted that new legislation would have
to be passed before any induction could take place. S. REP. No. 826, supra
note 5, at 155.
Moreover, even if a draft were to be instituted, the majority appears to
assume that everyone inducted must be combat trained. See 101 S. Ct. at
2656-57. However, Congress has merely stated that, were induction to occur,
the primary manpower needs would be for combat-trained personnel. S. REP.
No. 826, supra note 5, at 160 (emphasis added).
108. For a discussion of "administrative convenience," see notes 40-43 and
accompanying text supra.
109. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 677. For a discussion of Fron-
tiero, see notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
110. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. See also S. REP. No. 826, supra note 5, at 158-59.
111. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. at 498. Schlesinger affirmed the rejection of the administrative conven-
ience rationale, but because the Court had found that no due process viola-
tion had occurred, the administrative convenience rationale was inapplicable.
Id. at 510. For a discussion of Schlesinger, see notes 62-64 and accompanying
text supra.
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It is additionally proposed that the Court erred in stating in
absolute terms that "[m]en and women, because of the combat restric-
tions on women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft
or registration for a draft." 112 In light of the fact that men and women
who perform the same noncombat positions equally as well are obviously
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft, such
a statement evinces an "archaic and overbroad generalization," which is
no justification for a gender-based classification. 13
The Goldberg decision will operate to further muddy the already
uncertain scope of the mid-tier level of scrutiny in gender discrimination
cases, 1 4 thus postponing an elucidation of that standard of review until
later Supreme Court review. The vitality of the holding, however,
hinges to a substantial extent upon the future of the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment."15 If passed, the amendment would require a re-
evaluation of the decision of the Court, with the recognition that
equality of the sexes may be constitutionally mandated."16 However, at
present Goldberg stands more as an example of judicial reluctance to
examine a military decision and a reaffirmance of the separation of
powers principle 117 than it does as an elucidation of gender discrimina-
tion principles.
Elizabethanne M. Dilworth
112. 101 S. Ct. at 2658.
113. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508. For a discussion of "archaic
and overbroad generalizations," see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643;
Craig'v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
114. For a discussion of the mid-tier level of review, see notes 36-43 and
accompanying text supra.
115. For a discussion of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, see note
34 supra.
116. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
117. For a discussion of the separation of powers principle, see notes
44-51 and accompanying text supra.
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